On the Allure of Conspiracy Theories
For every complex problem, there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong.
~ H.L. Mencken
Conspiracy theories (henceforth, CTs) may be one of the most interesting, albeit depressing, fields of study. Depressing, because people actually believe this stuff, and beliefs often translate into real-world consequences. They are interesting for the same reasons, but also because they are a complete inversion of the principles that allow us to form accurate beliefs. Prof. Matt Browne said it well here:
Of course, there are many other epistemological practices that we could add, such as: impartial skepticism as opposed to selective skepticism; remaining agnostic until an assertion becomes well-evidenced; remaining open to good-faith criticism; prizing accuracy and a decent track record; epistemic humility (being ‘openly fallible’) – recognizing that we are human and humans can be biased and illogical. Richard Feynman said it best:
“The first principle is that you must not fool yourself—and you are the easiest person to fool.”
Conspiratorial Ideation
I am less interested in dissecting CTs than I am in understanding the cognitive processes that lead to them. These cognitive processes fall under the umbrella term conspiratorial ideation (henceforth, CI).
Importantly, not every stupid political opinion qualifies as conspiratorial ideation. Therefore, I will stick with the semi-narrow definition (derived from Uscinski’s and Parent’s definition of CTs):
Conspiratorial ideation is the tendency to accuse powerful individuals of working together in secret - for their own gain - against the common good.
Note that CI is a tendency - it acts as a sort of default to explain world events, with evidence as a secondary consideration (or not a consideration at all). This default is referred to in the literature as a monological worldview: viewing the world through one lens, in this case, a conspiratorial lens. Indeed, the greatest predictor of whether someone will believe a CT is whether they believe other, unrelated CTs. This suggests that CTs are accepted not because of their objective plausibility, but because of one’s subjective predisposition toward believing in them. Studies have found that those who score high in schizotypy - and delusional ideation in particular - are prone to CI. It has also been found that those who exhibit an intuitive-experiential style of thinking (i.e., sticking to one’s gut) are more likely than their deliberative, analytical counterparts to accept CTs.
CI generally arises in conjunction with negative events. We all engage in a lite version of this all the time. Whenever a highly publicized story breaks out - especially before all the facts are in - speculation and rumors are inevitable. Some of these speculations are accusatory in a way that lend themselves to CI. To naïve individuals, some of these conspiracy-laden speculations will seem plausible and satisfying, as they provide outlets for blame, outrage, closure, and so on. In this sense, CTs can resemble quasi-beliefs, beliefs that are held not because one thinks they are true, but because they are exciting or beneficial to believe in.
Benefits of conspiracy theorizing
It is hard to tell whether conspiracy theorists believe what they say they believe. It may be the case that they accept CTs simply to derive the benefits of believing them. To list a few examples:
CTs can provide us with a sense of meaning, that our purpose in life is to overthrow and rebel against oppressive and malevolent forces.
They provide us with a sense of certainty, hence why CTs are often made to sound common-sensical.
They provide us with a sense of control, wherein we resist the status quo or defy recommendations made by authority figures (such as health authorities recommending a vaccine to the public).
They provide us with a sense of structure. Perhaps the most parsimonious and satisfying way to view our world is as a Manichean struggle between good (us) and evil (them).
They provide us with a sense of closure – we don’t have to live with the burden of not knowing.
They make us seem well-informed and opinionated on topics that we haven’t given much thought.
They allow us to make sense of our messy and unpredictable world. Thus, to save on processing time and effort, conspiracy theorists conclude that anything negative or inconvenient has been done on purpose by malevolent actors.
They absolve us of the responsibility to grapple with urgent problems (hence the CTs around climate change).
They provide a source of entertainment (CTs can be fun to believe).
They provide us with a justification for our lowly position in society, by suggesting that such a burden was inflicted on us on purpose.
They help us fit in.
They help us stand out.
This is all to suggest that CTs can do a lot for us individually, even if they are malignant societally. Therefore, CI may exemplify a form of motivated reasoning, that is, looking for information that confirms one’s perspective and ignore or deny information that doesn’t. Though reasoning about anything requires some motivation, it is easy to see how motivated reasoning can lead us to questionable beliefs.
CTs are for losers
Not all of us feel the need to endorse CTs. Many of us don’t feel particularly lowly, lonely, bored, and so on. Therefore, CTs may be more compelling to losers. Whether they be political losers, social losers, or economic losers, those at the bottom of any hierarchy are often the most likely to incorporate CTs into their worldview.
It certainly doesn’t help that losers tend to keep in isolated communities which expose them to only a skewed sliver of information. This is the type of information flow that fosters one’s crippled epistemology - a term used for those who know very little, and what they do know is wrong.
Pessimistic conclusion: The pertinacious nature of CTs
Unfortunately, if a CT is compatible with one’s crippled epistemology, they become impervious to differing viewpoints. Attempts to correct their beliefs tend to backfire, for these attempts can easily fold into the conspiracy itself (e.g., “You are one of them”; “You have been brainwashed”; etc.). It is in this sense that CTs are unfalsifiable – there is nothing one can do to disprove them.
For conspiracy theorists themselves, believing CTs is relatively low-cost compared to the potential costs of rejecting them. If all of your friends believe the Earth is flat, you don’t want to be the skeptical killjoy who challenges this belief. Your skepticism could even be equated to betrayal and may lead to your exile from that group. Sometimes it is easier to just smile and nod.
So where do we go from here? We cannot help whether we find CTs compelling or not, believing them can serve our best interests, and attempts to disprove them are often more trouble than they’re worth. If one wants to become more resilient against CTs, it helps to recognize the conditions in which they arise. For example, we are more likely to incorporate CTs into our worldview if they provide us with simple, clear explanations of otherwise hard-to-grasp events. This is not always the case, though. Sometimes CTs can be impressively elaborate and creative. In such cases, the CT may be functioning as a source of entertainment, or as a credulity test to weed out pesky skeptics from the group. In my next newsletter, I will cover these more ‘groupish’ aspects of CTs in more detail. To conclude, we believe CTs when they provide us with benefits other than true knowledge. In such scenarios, we are inclined to engage in motivated reasoning.
Twitter: @RyanBruno7287
References:
Butter, M., & Knight, P. (2019). The history of conspiracy theory research: A review and commentary.
Dagnall, N., Drinkwater, K., Parker, A., Denovan, A., & Parton, M. (2015). Conspiracy theory and cognitive style: a worldview. Frontiers in psychology, 6, 206.
Douglas, K. M., Sutton, R. M., & Cichocka, A. (2017). The psychology of conspiracy theories. Current directions in psychological science, 26(6), 538-542.
Goertzel, T. (1994). Belief in conspiracy theories. Political psychology, 731-742.
Goreis, A., & Voracek, M. (2019). A systematic review and meta-analysis of psychological research on conspiracy beliefs: Field characteristics, measurement instruments, and associations with personality traits. Frontiers in psychology, 10, 205.
Marchlewska, M., Cichocka, A., & Kossowska, M. (2018). Addicted to answers: Need for cognitive closure and the endorsement of conspiracy beliefs. European journal of social psychology, 48(2), 109-117.
Oliver, J. E., & Wood, T. J. (2014). Conspiracy theories and the paranoid style (s) of mass opinion. American journal of political science, 58(4), 952-966.
Sunstein, C. R., & Vermeule, A. (2008). Conspiracy theories.
Uscinski, J. E., & Parent, J. M. (2014). American conspiracy theories. Oxford University Press.
Uscinski, J. E., Parent, J., & Torres, B. (2011). Conspiracy theories are for losers. In APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper.